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Abstract
The important epistemic function of photographic images is
their active role in construction and reconstruction of our
beliefs concerning the world and human identity, since we
often consider photographs as presenting reality or even the
Real itself.  Because photography can convince people of how
different social and ethnic groups and even they themselves
look, documentary projects and the dissemination of
photographic practices supported the transition from
disciplinary society to the present-day society of control. 
While both analog and digital images are formed from the
same basic materia, the ways in which this matter appears are
distinctive.  In the case of analog photography, we deal with
physical and chemical matter, whereas with digital images we
face electronic matter.  Because digital photography allows
endless modification of the image, we can no longer believe in
the truthfulness of digital images.  
Key Words
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1.  Introduction
In this paper I focus on two kinds of photographic images: 
analog imagery, which is a specific kind of technical image
connected to our reflections on reality itself because of its
physical and chemical properties; and digital imagery, which
does not support belief in the reality underlying it.  Although as
phenomena, analog and digital images seem to be very similar
or even the same, when perceiving a digital image we can
never be sure that it is true.  I consider these two kinds of
photographic images on the ontological and on the
epistemological level and show how they influence the form
and structure of our worldview, our consciousness and self-
consciousness and, most fundamentally, how they influence
our identity.  I begin by explaining the epistemic function of
the photographic image. 
The epistemic difference between analog and digital images is
related to the difference in material and hence derives from an
ontological difference.  Compared to the forms and structures
introduced with the analog photographic image, digital images
can change our worldview, our consciousness of the world, and
our sense of self.  They also can change our views on the
subject, identity, and social, political, and economic relations. 
Analog and digital images, however, share one attribute:  they
both strongly influence human understanding and experience.
2.  Anthropological epistemology
The epistemic function of photographic images, both analog
and digital, is one of many derivatives of the general impact of
images on human beings.  Since Plato, cognition has been one
of the well-recognized functions of images, a functionality
developed through empiricism, Hegelian idealism, and
twentieth-century Foucauldian structuralism.  I suggest that a
fruitful way of understanding this function, and the impact that
images have on our knowledge and on our consciousness, is
presented in Hans Belting's An Anthropology of Images ("Bild-
Antropologie").[1] Belting proposed that this sub-discipline
should be regarded as a theoretical field and treated as a kind
of reflection focused on images and pictures.  In his opinion,
such an anthropology of images should be looked at from
neither an historical nor technical point of view but as existing
somewhere among ethnology, philosophy, and art history.  Its
interdisciplinary character allows us to get closer to the multi-
layered function of images and pictures.  Belting’s theoretical
inspirations come from the writings of David Freedberg and
Georges Didi-Huberman, two scholars who straddle the thin
line dividing art history, philosophy, and ethnological
studies.[2]  Belting, occupied with image in a manner similar
to anthropologists and art historians, has conducted broad and
deep archival research on different kinds of pictures or
images.  (In German, as in Polish, there is just one word for
image and picture:  das Bild in German and obraz in Polish,
which complicates an analysis.)
Belting claims that the human body is the basic medium of the
image:  we carry images in our bodies, sometimes we
externalize them in different visual forms, and we take them
into our bodies through perception.  Although an image can be
embodied in media such as painting, photography, or
sculpture, the basic medium of this image is the human body
of the artist and of viewers.  Belting understands a human
body as a “living medium” that produces, perceives, and
remembers images, which are different from the images we
encounter through handmade or technical pictures.  The body
is thought of as a medium between the world and the mind: 
we perceive an image through our senses and remember it
through the neural paths that carry the sensed image into the
place in the brain where memories are stored.  The human
mind is a defined place in the world, that place where images
are produced and recognized.[3]
Belting’s view on images presents a broader anthropological
understanding of our interactions with images.  Referring
directly to photography, he reckons that the "modern history
of a body is repeated in an unique way by the history of
modern photography"[4] because photography "talks" about a
body by documenting it and presenting it.  We, while being
photographed, are changed into an image even before the
photograph is taken.  We internalize images that we see and
conceive as reliable, including images of ourselves.  We
incorporate these images into our mind’s eye and  enact them,
making them real by our actions and practices.  We serve as
their embodiment.  We perform according to our perceptions
of  images of ourselves and of the world.  An image is an
embodied medium, although the media may be varied
materials.  Belting understands an image to be three-
dimensional, with material, sensual and mental attributes, and
presents it as a triangular relation between medium-image-
body.[5]  That triangle points at an ambiguity of the
relationship between body and image because the mediation
of the third element, a material medium, is necessary for any
perception.  One image can inhabit various bodies, changing
and transforming them.
Belting describes the beginnings of the impact that images
have had on people, focusing on various interactions between
images and individuals and between images and social
groups.  Anthropological epistemology can be understood
therefore as a useful tool to understand the phenomena of
images, since it takes into consideration their cultural,
historical, social, and ethnic characteristics, as well as their
surroundings.  This anthropological perspective returns human
beings to their rightful place as active participants
experiencing themselves in media form.  In this way
anthropological epistemology differs from other theories of
media and analyses of techniques, as in this kind of
epistemology the human being is presented not only as a user
but also as the inventor of new techniques.[6]
3.  Analog photographic images and their indexical
character
What is the epistemic function of photographic images?  In
general, such images play an active role in the construction
and reconstruction of our beliefs concerning the world and
human identity.  This function differs in the cases of analog
and digital photographic images.  Analog images are older,
with a history that, with its beginnings in 1839, accustoms us
to perceive them as presenting reality, or even the Real itself,
because of their physical and chemical matter.  That the world
passing in front of the camera leaves a print or a trace would
not be obvious if the matter composing analog photographic
images were different.  Looking at analog photographic
images, it seems obvious that "something was there," since
the trace left by light touching the surface of photosensitive
paper attests to it. 
Charles Sanders Peirce was correct in his recognition of the
indexical character of analog photography.  An index is a sign
influenced by its object, a natural and obvious sign that is a
material effect of certain phenomena.  Peirce himself used
photography as an example of an indexical sign.  The material
light leaves a trace on certain physical and chemical matter,
and this is the moment of indexicality in photography.           
Photographs, especially instantaneous
photographs, are very instructive, because we
know that they are in certain respects exactly like
the objects they represent.  But this resemblance
is due to the photographs having been produced
under such circumstances that they were
physically forced to correspond point by point to
nature.  In that aspect, then, they belong to the
second class of signs, those by physical
connection.[7]
We cannot say, however, that an analog photograph is a
faithful and reliable representation of reality as it actually is,
lacking any contribution from the human hand and eye,
although this is a familiar perspective in both common opinion
and philosophy.  In my view, the most common mistake in
reflections on photography is caused by confusing the indexical
character of an analog photographic image with its meaning,
with its Icon.  Indexical character is extremely important and
should be understood as pointing to The Real and at the real
existence without stating anything about it, in the sense that
Peirce described it:
Even what is called an ‘instantaneous
photograph‘, taken with a camera, is a composite
of the effects of intervals of exposure more
numerous by far than the sands of the sea.[8]
This perspective is consistent with Peirce's semiological
concept that signs refer to other signs within a web of relations
but finally lead to "the thing in itself," which takes the form of
the Firstness:  nameless, incomprehensible, and manifesting
only in "uncontrolled variety and multiplicity."[9]  Thus
Firstness cannot have any direct iconic representation.  It
follows that there is no direct representation of the world, and
even photography, with its specific imagery, cannot assume
that role.  Photography points at reality but its indexical
character does not extract the one and only truth on its iconic
level.  Many theorists confuse indexical and iconic levels, which
is the main reason for misunderstandings concerning the
"realism" of photography.  "Realism" in photography should be
understood as an approach to objects in photographs as being
"like this," a mode of presentation that is historical and has a
well-defined function.  This perspective has become more
common with the appearance of various possibilities of altering
an image, and with digital images. 
Realists approach photography as "natural" language:  a
transparent medium of representation in which the matter of
analog photographic images is physical and chemical,
consisting of light and chemical components.  This approach
appears in numerous theories presented by different
philosophers and theoreticians.  Among them is Roland
Barthes. 
3.1 Roland Barthes on the ontology of analog photography
Roland Barthes can be seen as a post-structuralist, although
he admitted that in his writings about photography he turned
to phenomenology, connecting photography firmly with
memory and the past as disclosed by means of this special
medium.  He searched for the essential truth of photography
and found it in the revelation of "this-has-been," which
connects appearance with essential meaning; he stated that
the photograph always carries its referent with itself, that is its
referent is present on the photograph.  This theoretical step
can be understood psychologically.  Grieving for his dead
mother, he yearned to keep past reality alive.  A photo taken
in the winter garden, representing Barthes’s mother as a five-
year-old girl, gave him that experience.[10]  This belief in the
real person present on the photograph is possible only when
physical and chemical matter becomes glorified as truth or life-
giving. 
Barthes, in Camera Lucida, a book dedicated to photography,
distinguished two planes of an image.  'Studium' is the
meaning of a photograph or what we can learn from it. 
'Punctum' is that aspect of a photo that is subjective or
personal:  it can be fixation on a detail and intensive (the Time
passing.)[11]  Punctum’s function is confirmation of reality, a
confirmation that is unique to each viewer and is impossible to
communicate in the generalized manner of the socially
encoded studium or even to be expressed in language. 
Intensive punctum is the passage of time, the past-present,
which Barthes defines as the time of photography.[12]  By
recording that which is in the past, what was "real,“ secures
the stability of its being and fixes death, which will inevitably
come to the represented being.  Formal punctum, understood
as a detail, grabs our attention and causes the immobile image
on a wall to transcend itself, pointing at the life "out
there."[13]  It admits the existence of the pictured being
outside the frame and its continuation outside the frame of
representation.  Punctum is an element of the image situated
out of the visual layer of social code, certifying the essential
similarity between the image and reality. 
3.2 Analog photographic images:  the function of realism
At the beginnings of photography not everyone accepted the
belief that analog photographic images faithfully  represented
reality.  Eugene Delacroix, who used photographs for sketches
in his paintings, stated that photography cannot transmit the
truth of the reality because it is too accurate, and truth
emerges from selection and synthesis.  According to Delacroix,
photography is like a dictionary of nature that shows
everything because of its literal accuracy.[14]
The belief that truth is transmitted by a photographic image
was confirmed by tribunals, which started to use photographs
as evidence, as John Tagg reminds us in The Burden of
Representation:  Essays on Photographies and Histories.[15] 
Photographic images have been attributed by particular
individuals and social groups as proof attesting to  their
versions of truth.  Photographs were to document society and
each of its members.  What is interesting is that
[t]he early years of the development of the
photographic process coincided approximately
with the period of the introduction of the police
service into this country, and for more than a
hundred years the two have progressed
together….The value of photographs for the
purposes of identification was realized by the
police at a very early stage.[16]
Alphonse Bertillon, for example, photographed criminals for the
Prefecture of Police in Paris, and various unknown
photographers took pictures for the police in Birmingham in
the 1850s and 1860s (these photographs are kept in The West
Midlands Police Museum).  Other photographers shot pictures
of patients in asylums and hospitals.[17]  Photographs entered
various types of archives in public institutions[18] and
ultimately became a part of identity cards.  The accepted belief
that photography is realistic also helped to make it a scientific
tool in ethnological studies, as societies previously unknown
to  Europeans were described through the analogical medium. 
Moreover, analog photography was convincing to its audience
about the way the world looked, how different social and
ethnic groups looked, and how they themselves looked.  The
use of and discussion about photography in many
documentary projects (e.g., by Nadar (Gaspard-Félix
Tournachon), Bill Brandt, August Sander, the Farm Security
Administration) slowly spread through modern society,
becoming popular, cheap, easy, and increasingly
commonplace.
Analog photographic practices of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries strengthened the positivist, industrial,
rationalistic paradigm.  This process is now being analyzed by
poststructural theorists such as André Rouillé, who points at
the symbolic role of images in rushing transformations in time,
space, and communication towards industrial society.  Rouillé
explains that the analog photographic image appeared during
a "crisis of truth," when veracity had been weakened and,
after the Romantic period, doubt in objectivity appeared.  This
was a time of important social and political changes connected
with industrialization and the abandonment of traditional
monarchies.  The large migration of nondescript common
people, moving from the countryside to the cities, and the
subsequent changes in urban power relations, demanded new
forms of representation.  Photography answered this demand
perfectly, offering a scientific, machine-like method of
representation.  Photographs were easy to produce and
credible because of the apparent lack of an individual's
subjective influence on the form of an image.[19]  Moreover,
analog photography played an historical role in the
establishment of a new social and epistemic order, since these
two realms are closely bound by commonly shared belief
systems concerning the world.[20]
Rouillé asserts that photographic characteristics, like
instantaneity, automaticity, speed, and repeatability,
influenced culture.  Tagg questions why photography so deeply
influences our lives both as individuals and as a part of certain
communities.  He constructs his answer from the Marxist
thought of Louis Althusser, who held that an individual was
largely defined by structures and systems (what he termed the
Ideological State Apparatuses), among which he included
media and education.[21] 
One’s concept of self is therefore a subjective identity, a
subject or product.  Atlhusser’s theory of ideology
distinguished the repressive and the ideological, both of which
influenced the concrete activities of identifying oneself, of
doing things:  "an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and
its practice, or practices.  This existence is material."[22]  This
is the embodiment of the ideology.  Tagg further uses
Althusser's interpellation to examine the power that
photographic images have to make us identify with our
photographic effigies. 
4.  Transformation of photographic practices through
digital processes
The thorough spread of photographic practices, now almost
universally accessible to groups and individuals, contributed to
the rise of modern, disciplinary society, defined by Michel
Foucault as a society in which power is internalized.  As
monarchies and their absolute power declined and societies
moved towards democracy, there appeared a need for a new
kind of disciplined body, one with internalized rules. 
Photography was involved soon after its invention, a process
described in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison by
Foucault.[23]  It helped define identities by depicting different
social classes (e.g., the work of Nadar and Bill Brandt), races
(in many documentary projects of various colonial empires),
ethnic groups (e.g., the photographic records of Nazi-era
Germany), and socially-constructed gender roles (e.g., popular
fashion photography).  
The technical means, knowledge, and materials of early
photography were privileges limited to specialists, often as
representatives of public institutions.  However, when Kodak
invented a cheap, handy camera,[24] the apparatus became
accessible to everyone, from professionals to laypersons.  The
power to document and record was no longer controlled, but
took on a democratic form:  photographic documentation
spread the power of photography to a much broader segment
of society.  When anyone could take a photo, individuals
started to believe that they could present themselves
autonomously.  They were, however, subjecting themselves to
a well-defined system of representations.
Tagg, using the work of Althusser and Foucault, shows
photographic practices of documentation as dispersal tools
used to diffuse power within societies.  He locates
photographic practices in the realm of Althusser’s Ideological
State Apparatuses, slowly, imperceptibly, and visually
cooperating in the processes of subjection and repression, by
creating images in which we believe.  We believed in
photographic images even more once Kodak cameras became
widely owned, because we personally executed them and we
wanted our acts to be perceived as independent and
autonomous. 
Following the line of analysis started by Tagg, we can go on
reflecting contemporary Individual photographic practices that
became even easier and more fun after the advent of the
digital apparatus.  We obtained digital cameras, which we use
to take digital pictures all the time and then share them with
others via social media.  We can observe in these practices a
certain transition in the function of photography:  it has shifted
from an emphasis on defining social groups to one of defining
individuals.  There has also been a shift from the necessity of
one’s signature (made by light passing in front of
photosensitive material) to a numeric/digital representation,
open to variations and modifications.  Analog photographic
images had a confirmed rational identity represented by
means of a geometrical perspective, precisely putting the
individual (as belonging to a certain social group) in the
world.  Digital photographic images, on the other hand, work
for a proliferated identity, detached from the assumed ground,
multiplying, relational, and variable.  Contemporary
individuals, deprived of determinate essence, see themselves
differently from how people saw themselves before; the
contemporary world is understood as a system of
interconnections rather than as a hierarchy.  Conjoined in a
relationship defined by a social context, the world relatively
independent of the camera is seen no longer as the subject of
the digital image.
Contemporary society, as Foucault described it, is not
disciplinary anymore.  Today's digital, modular society is not a
hierarchy but a web, and the structures of power are even
more invisible.  Machines do not determine the type of society
but, as Gilles Deleuze pointed out,  "types of machines are
easily matched with each type of society."[25]  Deleuze called
this "the society of control,"[26] arguing that, from a historical
and technical perspective, in such a society masses are not
important anymore.  Masses are closed in factories, schools,
hospitals, prisons, or families. 
Only the individual is important, or rather his or her numeric
representation.  Living in the virtual world of digital photos,
digital data, digital work, social contacts, and digital money, all
of which are controlled in innumerous repects, we leave traces
that are recorded.  This situation is the most perfect form of
the Panopticon, the system of constant one-way vigilance over
nearly every aspect of human life that Jeremy Bentham
presented in  "Panopticon; or The Inspection-House: 
containing The Idea of a New Principle of Construction
applicable to any Sort of Establishment, in which Persons of
any Description are to be kept under Inspection."[27] Such
surveillance is no longer limited to prisoners, the ill, and
disadvantaged individuals mentioned earlier; the watchful
system is now present in all aspects of modern society.
Foucault and Deleuze argued that representations are not of
an independent reality but are dictated by social, economic,
and political institutions.  Therefore, people were wrong in
thinking that what the analog camera captured was an
independent Real; it is a visual tool for creating  images that
aid the processes of social self-definition and of defining one's
individual identity.  With the advent of digital representations,
which can be manipulated not only by the unseen institutions
of power but also to a more limited extent by individuals, the
hierarchical system in which institutions of power dominated
life dissolves into a system structured as interconnections
among individuals.
5.  Ontos and the epistemic role of digital photography
Although digital photography has become ubiquitous, it differs
from analog photography not only because of its availability,
cheapness, and omnipresence.  We can no longer believe in
the truthfulness of digital images, since we can never be sure
to what extent they represent the world around us, our selves,
or whether they might be simulacra.  This is not only because
we can easily alter digital images, since analog photographic
images have been manually altered, retouched, and
recombined since the very beginning of photography, as it was
explicit for example in techniques used in the area of
pictorialism at the transition from nineteenth to twentieth
century, or in constructivist and surrealist photomontage of
1920s and 1930s of the twentienth century.  I think that there
is another important factor at work here:  we have lost faith in
the existence of the world underlying the image, the Real
itself. 
As Jean Baudrillard would say, we became agnostics about
reality28 and one has to bracket one’s belief in reality, as
Edmund Husserl advised us to do.[29]  While analog and
digital images are formed from the same basic matter, the
ways in which each appears are different:  analog photography
deals with physical and chemical matter whereas digital
images are electronic.  This difference affects the epistemic
function of such images.  We can no longer believe that
"something was there," or that a certain part of reality has
appeared at a certain time and was imprinted upon
photosensitive material.  The digital image is flat, not three-
dimensional.  It can be modulated but it cannot reach
underlying material and therefore cannot touch reality.  It
plays with visuality, so that we cannot be sure about its
veracity, and in place of objectivity we obtain only something
subjective.  We realize that we never truly perceive reality as
such but always "as if."  We cannot touch the numerical, fluid
matter that appears to us visually, so that we cannot confirm
the knowledge obtained and proclaim its objectivity.
6.  Conclusion
All images and signs created and used by people have an
epistemic function, although forgetting about the epistemic
dimension of images has a long tradition.  This tradition was
initiated by classical aesthetics, which concentrated on the
aesthetic aspects of pictorial works and on their emotional
potential.  The social atmosphere accompanying the rise of
classical aesthetics in the mid-eighteenth century aided such
an attitude:  Alexander Baumgarten, with his treatise
Aesthetica, defined a new, wider theory of aesthetics as the
study of interconnected beauty and art.  Baumgarten and
Charles Batteaux defined liberal arts by their common
characteristic, their Beauty.  Beauty was to be recognized by
means of the educated viewer's disinterested contemplation of
artistic subtlety, refinement, harmony, and the sublime.  The
connection between social structures and discourse on art was
made explicit in the case of eighteenth-century contingencies
between the roccoco in painting, interior design, sculpture,
music, and the feudal structure of European societies before
the French Revolution. 
The compatibility of this kind of philosophical, idealistic
reflection and the ornate classical style in favor at the time can
give us a deeper insight into aesthetic analysis.  Batteaux,
Baumgarten, Burke, and Kant were writing in the last years of
European aristocratic ascendancy, before the beginning of the
drive towards democracy.  One might consider how social
structures and classes were depicted in European paintings in
those years.  In France, for example,  Antoine Watteaux
painted in the new style of fête galante, depicting pleasure-
seeking activities of  elegant young men and women in parks
and gardens.  In Prussia, Frederick II constructed aristocratic
architecture, including a royal library and cathedral.  In
England, Thomas Gainsborough and Joshua Reynolds depicted
charming British aristocrats  strolling on their properties or
relaxing in famous resting places.  The essence and structure
conveyed by these works forces us to scrutinize their epistemic
dimensions and therefore the class character of artistic
expression as the link between a kind of social structure and
the artistic images created within it. 
André Rouillé documents the ways in which present-day
society and the popularization of photographic images
coincide.  The essence and structure of society presented as
‘‘truth" are evident in Nadar's photographs of Paris bourgoisie,
August Sander's documentations of pre-Nazi Germany,  Bill
Brandt's studies of class divisions in Great Britain, and
photographers working within the U.S. Farm Security
Administration (FSA) program during the Roosevelt
administration, all of which demonstrate the overlap of social
structures and artistic creation.
Plato clearly recognized the epistemic role of the image, even
though he opposed this form of expression because of its
imperfect character.  He understood image as merely an
imperfect reflection of reality and ideas.  Because erroneous
interpretations have effects, the influence of images upon
society should be restricted.
The epistemic role of images consists in co-creating our
convictions and beliefs about the world and ourselves. 
Epistemology, as the study of cognition, is an historical science
that deals with historically shaped and conditioned belief
systems.  Epistemology's historicity, considered from the point
of view of Foucault's archaeology and genealogy rather than
from that of history, can be understood as a necessarily
expanding sequential order, sprouting out of its essential
critical role.  From a genealogical point of view, Foucault, in
The Order of Things, showed how changing historical
conditions and not transcendental forms explain the changing
forms of social order,[30] while in an archaeology explains the
broad episteme underlying and it.[31]
Epistemology reveals the non-necessary and non-universal
character of any belief system and proves that such beliefs are
not rooted in metaphysics.  If there are no universal truths to
be found and truth is relative to an historical era (as belief
systems are), then belief can become knowledge only as an
ironic, suspended, "as if" probability.  
One should consider the epistemic dimension of digital images
and their matter as part of the study of contemporary
knowledge.  Such images reflect the form of our world's
existence as an audiovisual space-time continuum.  Digital
images are how we currently access the world, and they have
in a considerable way transformed the real world into a virtual
pictorial one. This is in part because we take pictures of
something, which we can then manipulate indefinitely.  Such
manipulations by the individual photographer, rather than the
application of Kantian categories of the human mind, impose
an order on the indeterminate matter of the world.   As the
certitude that the world actually looks the way it is portrayed
is taken away, we again have to face the problem of radical
Cartesian skepticism -- the Cartesian method in which only
doubt and the doubting subject remain.  It is not an accident
that the movie The Matrix introduced a thought-experiment
referring to Cartesian doubt.  What if the human brain was
enclosed in a glass jar and stimulated, such that one had the
mere impression and consciousness of the continuity of one’s
existence?  Would such a brain have tools allowing it to gain
awareness about its actual state of being kept in a jar and
being subjected to suitable stimulation?  There is no way to
tell whether we live in a world or a simulacrum of one.  Such
an interpretation of reality opens up a wide space allowing a
boundless expanse for the human imagination.
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